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Chapter 2  Reduction and Selection
2 .1  Introduction
In the last chapter I upheld the orthodox view that reducibility to physics, in the sense 
of type identity, is too strong a requirement for the categories of most special sciences, 
and for those of psychology i n particular.  In this chapter, however, I want to show 
that the case for reducibility to physics is rather stronger than is generally 
recognized.  More specifically, I want to show that this case is compelling for those 
special sciences that do not have a teleological underpinning.  As it happens, I think 
that psychology in particular does have such a teleological underpinning, and that its 
categories are therefore not reducible to physical categories.  But my argument will 
imply that special sciences without a teleological underpinning are indeed reducible to 
physics. 
2.2  An Unexplained Coincidence
It will be convenient to begin with the functionalist view of mental states.  As I 
explained in the last chapter, functionalists view mental states as causal intermediaries 
between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs.  According to functionalistm, you 
will be in a given mental state as long as you are in a physical1 state which plays the 
relevant causal role between perception and behaviour. 
 It is widely regarded as a great merit in functionalism that it leaves room for 
irreducibility, and allows that mental states should have different physical rea 
lizations in different people, or even in the same person at different times.  According 
to functionalism, what is common between between John Major and Boris Yeltsin, 
when they each believe that there is an ice-cream in front of them, say, is that t hey 
are each in some physical state which is characterictically caused by the presence of
an ice-cream, and which characteristically causes them to reach out if they want an 
ice-cream.  But functionalism doesn't require that this be the same physical state in 
both cases -- which is just as well, given how unlikely it is that there should be some 
strictly physical feature common to all and only those people who believe that there is 
an ice-cream in front of them. 
 However, there is som ething rather puzzling about the picture that functionalism 
now invites us to accept.  If states like believing there is an ice-cream in front of you, 
and wanting that ice-cream, are realized by different physical states in different 
people, then why do these states always have the same behavioural effect in all those 
different people, namely, reaching out for the ice-cream?  In general, we expect 
physically similar states to have similar effects, and physically different states to have 
differen t effects.  So why in this case should physically different states have the same 
effect? 
 Consider an analogy.  Imagine that people forced to eat a certain restricted diet --
nothing but reheated brussels sprouts, say -- invariab ly develop certain characteristic 
symptoms -- inflamed ankles and knees, say.  Nutritionists investigate this 
phenomenon.  But they find no uniform explanation.  In one case, the sprouts harbour 
a virus which flourishes in the ankles and kn ees and provokes the immune system.  In 
another case, eating the sprouts leads to excess production of uric acid and hence to 
gouty attacks.  In another, the diet leads to a nutritional deficiency which depletes the 
cartilage which protects the joints.  And so on.  For each person, there is some 
physiological explanation of why the diet leads to the inflammation, but the 
explanation is different in each case.  I take it that this would be incredible.  If the diet 
triggered ei ther of just two different sequences, say, both of which then happened to 
cause inflammation in the ankles and knees, we could perhaps view this as a curious 
coincidence, an amusing oddity with no further explanation.  But that it should trigger 
an i ndefinite number of quite different sequences, yet all of them lead to the same 
inflammation, would surely be quite absurd, in the absence of further explanation. 
Yet the thesis of variable realizability seems to commit us to something quite 
analogous , namely, that the same perceptual inputs give rise to quite different internal 
states in different people, and yet those different internal states will all end up 
generating the same behavioural outputs.  This too is surely quite absurd, in the abse 
nce of further explanation. 
Contrast the functionalist2 picture with the kind of situation where physical reduction 
is possible, as when kinetic theory reduces the classical gas laws to the basic 
dynamics of molecular movement.  At fir st sight it mightn't be clear how this kind of 
case differs from the functionalist picture.  After all, aren't there lots of different ways 
in which the molecules can be moving around in a gas at a given temperature, thus 
giving us a heterogeneity of physical states for the single macro-state of having that 
temperature? 
But, even so, there is still something physically in common between all those different 
physical states, namely, that the molecules have a given mean kinetic energy.  It is t 
his commonality that then enables us to explain such things as why an increase in 
temperature at constant volume always results in an increase in pressure. 
Reducibility to physics does not involve the absurdly strong requirement that the 
instances of the reduced category should share all their physical properties.  The 
requirement is only that there should be some physical property present in all and only 
those instances, which then allows a uniform physical explanation of why those 
instances alw ays give rise to a certain sort of result. 
But that is precisely what we don't have in the functionalist case.  If there is nothing 
physically in common among the realizations of a given mental state, then there is no 
possibility of any uniform e xplanation of why they all give rise to a common physical 
result.  And that's what I find puzzling. 
Imagine that the temperatures and pressures of gases were always realized by internal 
molecular motions, and temperature increases always led to p ressure increases, but 
yet it was impossible to explain this in terms of basic physics.  I take it that this would 
be incredible.  But that's what functionalism is asking us to believe about psychology. 
It is worth emphasizing that I am not accusing the functionalist picture of 
inconsistency, but only of incredibility.  The dificulty I am concerned with arises 
when some mental state S, which mediates between physical input R and physical 
output T, is realized by a range of different phy sical states Pi.  The puzzle is: why do 
all the different Pis which result from R all nevertheless yield the common effect 
T?  Now, it is possible that every such Pi should just happen to yield T, just as it is 
possible that all the different ph ysical consequences of eating reheated brussels 
sprouts should just happen to cause inflamed ankles and knees.  However, if this were 
so, it would be the kind of coincidence that cries out for explanation. 
At bottom, the difficulty I am raising i s an empirical one.  Our experience of the 
world has shown us that if a certain physical result always appears after certain 
physically specified antecedents, then there is always some uniform explanation in 
terms of physical laws.  But the func tionalist picture violates this general principle.  It 
commits us to the existence of a physical generalization, namely, that R leads to T, 
but denies that it can be explained in physical terms.  I think this ought to make us 
think again about f unctionalism.  (For other versions of this argument, see Papineau, 
1985; Searle, 1985, ch 5; MacDonald, 1986, sect II.2.) 
2.3  Laws in the Special Sciences
Although the last section focused on functionalism i n the philosophy of mind, the 
problem at issue is clearly generalizable to any category in any special science which 
(a) is related by empirical law to physical antecedents and physical consequents yet (b) 
is variably realized at the physical level.  For in any such case we face the same 
puzzle of why all the different physical realizations of the special category should 
give rise to the same physical result. 
One obvious way of resolving this puzzle would be to deny (a), that is, to deny that 
the special category in question is related by law to physical antecendents and 
consequents.  For there obviously won't be any puzzle about how the different 
physical realizations of some special S all produce the same physical result in 
appropriate cir cumstances, if there isn't any such result that they all produce. 
It do not propose to adjudicate how far this move is plausible for the different special 
sciences.  The question of the existence of psychological, social and biological laws is 
a standard topic in the philosophy of these special  sciences, and there is no question 
of engaging with the huge literature on these questions here.  But what I shall show in 
this section is that, if you do want to resist reductionism by denying the existence of 
laws, then your denial needs to be whole-hearted.  It is not enough merely to maintain 
that the laws of biology, say, are less strict than those in basic physics.  For even lax 
biological laws will be puzzling, if there are no r eductive relations between biological 
categories and physical ones. 
Let me illustrate this point by considering the position adopted by Jerry Fodor in his 
infuential article "Special Sciences" (1974).  In that article, Fodor defends the general 
f unctionalist picture I have been concerned with so far:  he takes it that any special S 
will be realized on different occasions by different physical Pis, but that nevertheless 
such special Ss can enter into laws linking them with subsequent resultsR , in virtue of 
the fact that processes operating on the physical level will generally lead from each Pi 
to R. 
However, Fodor adds a twist, which might seem to avoid the difficulty I have raised 
for functionalism:  Fodor insists that the law linki ng S with result R will have 
exceptions.  On Fodor's picture, not all the Pis which realize S will give rise to result 
R, and in consequence the S-R law will not be invariable.  So Fodor seems to have an 
immediate answer to the question of why a ll the different realizations of S yield the 
common result R -- they don't. 
However, note that Fodor continues to hold that S usually leads to R, or tends to lead 
to R, or some such.  And this in itself raises a puzzle, in the absence of any conc 
essions to the reducibility of S.  For if there is no common physical pattern at all to 
the realizations of S, then it will be puzzling that there is even a tendency for S to lead 
to R. 
By denying that laws involving special categories are exact, Fodor can resist the 
argument for an exact reduction.  But he still faces an argument for an approximate 
reduction, as long as his special science contains approximate laws.  For even such 
approximate laws will be puzzling, unless there i s some common physical category 
which usually realizes S, and thereby explains why S is usually followed by R. 
There is, I think, a general pattern here.  By weakening the extent to which a special 
science contains general truths, you can weaken the extent to which its categories 
have to be reducible to physics.  But you can only avoid reductionist conclusions 
completely by denying that the special categories enter into general lawlike patterns at 
all. 
By way of further illustration, con sider a suggestion made by Davidson.  In general 
Davidson is sceptical as to whether any serious laws can be framed using 
psychological terminology.  However, in "Hempel on Explaining Action" (1976) he 
offers the suggestion that the generalizati ons involved in explaining and predicting 
actions are always person-specific.  We can know that Jim, say, will buy an ice-cream 
when he wants one, will lose his temper if he thinks someone has been rude to him, 
and so on.  But at the same time t here are other people of whom these things aren't 
true.  And so, even if we can know a law which applies to Jim, this doesn't mean that 
there are psychological laws ranging over people in general. 
My immediate concern here is not to evaluate this ingenious suggestion, but just to 
point out that the reductionist argument still gets some grip on even this minimalist 
Davidsonian conception of psychology as a generalizing science.  Davidson still holds 
that it is a general truth that if Jim want s an ice-cream, he buys one.  And this itself 
would be mysterious unless there is at least a uniform physical realization of Jim 
wanting an ice-cream.  (In fairness to Davidson, it should be noted that he takes the 
relevant generalizations to be dispositional as well as person-specific.  This raises 
further issues which I discuss in the next section.) 
It is true that a uniform physical realization for Jim wanting an ice-cream doesn't 
amount to a very strong form of reduction.  But it's still something, given that even 
Jim wanting an ice-cream can in principle be realized by different physical states in 
different instances.  Once more, the moral is that, insofar as generalizations of any 
kind are admitted in a special science, to that extent there will be an argument for a 
corresponding amount of reduction.3
2.4  Functionalism and Dispositions
There is one obvious way in which S could be variably realized and yett here be no 
mystery about a general law linking S and R.  Namely, if S were a dispositional term, 
defined as the state of being disposed to give rise to R in appropriate 
circumstances.  In that case there wouldn't be any further need to explain, via some 
physical reduction of S, why the different realizations of S all give rise to R:  giving 
rise to R is precisely what makes those different states all count as realizations of S in 
the first place. 
It is possible that this thought has ten ded to obscure the difficulty that I have been 
raising for functionalism.  Functionalism makes it a matter of definition that any given 
mental state gives rise to specified behavioural effects.  And so, if you focus on this 
aspect of functionali sm, it may seem natural to conclude that there can't be any real 
difficulty about how such states can be differently realized physically, and yet have 
common physical effects.  Isn't this just an upshot of their functionalist definitions? 
However my puzzle can't be dissolved that easily. The basic difficulty is that 
functionalist concepts aren't so much dispositional concepts as theoretical 
ones.  Functionalism defines special categories not just as states which produce 
certain effects, but rather as states which enter into a certain structures of causes and 
effects.  According to the functionalist picture of psychology, for example, pain will 
be defined not just as the state that characterisically causes avoidance behaviour, but 
also a s the state that characteristically results from bodily damage;  again, the belief 
that there is an ice-cream in front of me will be defined not just as the state that 
characteristically causes me to reach out if I want an ice-cream, but is also the state 
that characteristically results from my looking at an ice-cream with my eyes open.  In 
general, functionalist definitions of Ss allude to their resulting from Rs, as well as to 
their causing Ts. 
This means that the argument against S being variably realized now goes through as 
before.  We can put it like this:  if the various realizations of the state which arise 
from R have nothing physically in common, then how come they all alike give rise to 
T?  If the various realization s of the state which arises when people look at an ice-
cream have nothing in common, how come they all alike lead to their reaching out for 
it? 
The presence of R as an independent criterion for the presence of an S, independent of 
S's effects, means t hat we can't any longer simply account for S's realizations all 
yielding T by saying that's what makes them realizations of S.  For now something 
else also makes them realizations of S, namely, that they arise from R. 
It is worth emphasizing that the position which I am claiming faces a difficulty is not 
functionalism understood merely as the claim that psychological states can be defined 
in terms of structures of causes and effects.  Rather, the difficulty arises specifically 
when functiona lism in this sense is combined with the thesis that psychological states 
are variably realized.  So I have no argument against the philosopher who insists that 
our concept of pain is a concept of a second-order state defined in terms of certain 
perce ptual causes and behavioural effects, and not a concept of any specific physical 
state.  My concern is only to point out that, unless there is a specific physical state 
which generally realizes pain, albeit an unknown one, it would be a puzzle why th ose 
perceptual causes are generally followed by those behavioural effects. 
A connected point.  I am exploring an argument for the conclusion that the categories 
of the special sciences must be reducible to physics.  This is not an argument, 
however, for the conclusion that the practitioners of the special sciences have to know 
that reduction.  For, even if such a reduction is in principle available, you don't 
necessarily have to know it to have an adequate conceptual grasp of the releva nt 
special categories, and hence be in a position empirically to investigate them.  After 
all, the classical gas laws were well known long before kinetic theory was 
developed.  (This point would be too obvious to be worth making, were it not for my 
suspicion that many people are attracted to "functionalism", in the strong sense of 
variable realizability, because they think that without it the special sciences would be 
under an unfortunate immediate obligation to produce physical reductions of th eir 
categories.  But of course there are plenty of other possible justifications for not 
producing immediate reductions, apart from functionalism in this strong sense.) 
David Lewis (1980) combines a functionalist definition of psychological conce pts 
with the view that those states are uniformly realized in any given species.  Up to a 
point this position circumvents the difficulty I am raising.  Within any given species, 
so to speak, there is no puzzle as to why the state that arises fro m R always gives rise 
to T, for by Lewis's own account that state will be a homogeneous physical state 
which will lead to T as a matter of physical law.  However, there does remain a 
problem across species.  If the central states that result fro m bodily damage in 
octupuses and and frogs and humans are all so different, how come they all lead to 
movement away from the external cause of the pain?  Of course, behavioural or 
neurophysiological observation of each such species could show us that the various 
central states in question all give rise to such avoidance behaviour, that is, could show 
us that all these species had states that fitted the general functionalist definition of 
pain.  But, without further explanation, there would still be a puzzle as to why, despite 
their physical differences, the different central states that arise from bodily damage 
should have the same physical effects.  (By now a solution to this puzzle will no 
doubt be suggesting itself.  Namely, that th ese states all have the same effect because 
they have all been naturally selected to produce that effect.  But let us leave this 
solution until section 2.7.  My current concern is only to establish that there is a 
puzzle here to be solved.) 
2.5  The Irreducibility of Ordinary Dispositions
The argument of the last section showed that there is no reason to suppose that 
dispositional concepts in general will be physically reducible.  Provided a given d 
ispositional concept doesn't enter into any further laws, in addition to the definitional 
"law" that connects it to its display, then we have no reason to expect reduction.  For 
example, redness is arguably definable as a dispositional characteristic of objects, 
namely, the characteristic of producing a certain kind of perceptual response in 
normal observers.  But it remains perfectly possible that there is nothing physically in 
common between all the different objects that produce this response .  If the notion of 
redness entered into certain kinds of further laws, then there would be reason to 
expect a reduction.  But the mere fact that all red things make normal people see red 
doesn't itself give reason to expect reducibility.4
Again, the biological notion of fitness is arguably definable as a dispositional 
characteristic of biological traits, namely, the characteristic of enhancing survival 
better than alternative traits influenced by the same genetic locus.  But it would be 
wrong to expect that just because of this there will be anything physically in common 
between different fit traits and the ways they enhance survival. 
Of course, if we want to explain the display of a disposition by reference to that disp 
osition itself, as when we explain someone's visually judging something to be red by 
reference to its redness, or when we explain some trait's selection by reference to its 
fitness, then we will be committed to the disposition as something more than just the 
property of producing that effect.  But this commitment to "something more" could 
just be that there is some physical basis for the production of the effect.  And this 
commitment can thus leave it open that the physical basis might be differ ent in 
different instances of the dispositional property. 
Let me emphasize the requirements for the irreducibility of a dispositional 
property.  Such irreducibility requires that the property not enter into any substantial 
non-dispositional laws, that is, that there not be any uniform physical cause for the 
different physical bases of the disposition, nor any uniform physical effects which 
aren't themselves effects of the purely dispositional definition (for in this latter case 
we would the facet he non-definitional issue of why all the different realizations 
which are definitionally grouped together by their dispositional display also always 
have another common physical effect).  These are fairly strong requirements, but I see 
no reason to s uppose that they are not satisfied in plenty of familiar cases.  For 
example, I take it that redness does not in fact have any such uniform causes or 
uniform effects.  There is surely no uniform physical cause for all the different 
physical base s for redness, nor, arguably, any uniform effect of redness 
independently of its uniform effect on observers.  And similarly with fitness:  there is 
no single cause of all the different physical properties which make different traits fit, 
nor an y uniform effect of those properties apart from their influence on 
survival.  Which is why, once more, there is no reason to expect redness or fitness to 
be reducible. 
We might wonder why dispositional concepts are useful, if they cove r a 
heterogeneity of different physical bases, and have no uniform causes or effects apart 
from their defining display.  However, there are obvious reasons why it might 
sometimes be useful to classify things together just in virtue of their producing a 
certain kind of effect.  An interior designer may not care about the molecular 
constitution of a fabric, nor even about how it was made, but simply about the colour 
responses it will produce in humans.  Again, suppose we are interested in pre dicting 
the spread or extinction of some biological trait.  All we need to know is its fitness, 
not its physical nature or its developmental history.  If two different traits have the 
same fitness relative to their competitors, then they will ev olve in the same way, 
whatever the other differences between them. 
2.6  The Meaning of Reduction
One question sometimes raised in the literature is whether there is really a principled 
difference between reduction and variable realization:  for, in a case of variable 
realization, why shouldn't we simply disjoin the various Pis which realize S, and then 
say that S reduces to (P1 v P2 v . . . v Pn)? 
In "Special Sciences" Fodor responds to this challenge by saying that the disjunctive 
property (P1 v . . . Pn) won't in general be a genuine natural physical kind, and the 
generalization (P1 v . . . Pn) -> Q won't therfore be a genuine law.  However, Fodor's 
analysis stops here.  As he admits, he has n o explicit account of what makes some 
kinds natural and others not, and so at this point simply rests his case on intuitions. 
Other anti-reductionists have adopted a rather more sophisticated approach.  Instead 
of resting their case on intuitions as to whether the disjunction (P1 v . . . Pn) is a 
natural kind, they have pointed out that the relevant disjunction might be infinitely 
long, or indeed mightn't even be recursively specifiable (cf. Hellman and Thompson, 
1975), and that therefore the que stion of any reductive explanation of high-level laws 
in terms of lower-level ones doesn't even arise. 
This more sophisticated line is certainly of technical interest.  But I would like to 
point out that the argument of this chapter adds weight t o Fodor's view that even a 
finite disjunction of physical states can fail to qualify as a reduction (even though it 
disagrees with Fodor on the extent to which such reductions are needed).  For the 
argument of this chapter suggests that such a finite disjunction of different physical 
states ought not to count as a reduction, whenever the picture it leaves us with at the 
reducing level is physically incredible. 
Suppose, to return to my earlier illustration, that the appearance of inflamed ankles a 
nd knees as a result of eating reheated brussels sprouts has a name -- say, 
brussitis.  And suppose, as before, that different cases of brussitis are due to different 
physical processes.  My point is that the list of such physical processes does n't need 
to be recursively unspecifiable for us to feel that there is something unsatisfactory 
about the equation of brussitis with the disjunction of those physical processes.  For, 
as soon as the number of the disjuncts gets above two or three, wew ill judge, quite 
rightly, that it is incredible that there should be no further explanation of why reheated 
brussels sprouts always lead to inflamed ankles and knees. 
In effect I am suggesting that the notion of a reduction is precisely the notion of an 
account which shows that nothing incredible is happening at the physical level.  Fodor 
says that a finite disjunction is not a reduction because the physical categorization 
involved isn't "natural".  I am adding the thought that this lack of "naturalness" resides 
in the fact that such disjunctions are too heterogeneous for it to be plausible that there 
should be no further explanation for the disjuncts all producing the same effect (a 
thought which is not available to Fodor himself, given tha t he sees no need for such 
explanations). 
2.7  Teleology and Irreducibility
Despite the argument I have been developing in this chapter, I don't in fact think that 
psychological categories are reducible to p hysical ones.  I think there is a different, 
non-reductive explanation for why variably realized psychological states often 
produce uniform physical effects.  It is high time I explained how this might work. 
By way of an analogy, consider th is example.  All domestic water heaters contain 
thermostatic devices which stop the heating when the water gets hot enough.  If we 
denote the threshhold temperature by R, the thermostat operating by S, and the 
heating stopping by T, then we have the generalization, applicable to all domestic 
water heaters, that R -> S -> T.  However, there clearly isn't any physical reduction of 
S here:  there are many different kinds of thermostats, with quite different designs and 
constitutions, and with nothing physically in common apart from their all turning the 
heater off when the water gets hot enough. 
Even so, there is scarcely much of a puzzle here as to why all the physically different 
realizations of S produce the common result T.  The obvious answer is that water 
heaters are designed by people not to burn out, and that's why they all contain 
thermostats that switch off the heating when the water gets hot enough.  We can say 
the mechanisms in water heaters have been selected by the designers in order to 
switch the water heaters off.  That's what the thermosats are there for. 
Another example.  All vertebrates who breed within a fixed location will act towards 
invaders of that territory in such a way as to frightena way those invaders.  Here let R 
be the invasion of the territory, S the characteristic behaviour, and T the departure of 
invaders.  Then, plausibly, for such animals, R -> S -> T.  Yet there is no physical 
reduction of S:  there is not hing physically in common between all the different 
forms of territorial behaviour displayed by vertebrates, apart from the fact that they all 
make intruders go away. 
But, once more, there is scarcely anything puzzling here.  The obvious explanat ion 
for the fact that these physically different kinds of behaviour all have the uniform 
effect of frightening away intruders is that natural selection has favoured those 
behaviours precisely because they frighten away intruders.  As in the previous 
example, the different physical causes have all been selected in order to produce that 
effect. 
I favour the "aetiological" theory of teleological notions like function, purpose and 
design.  (See Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1989b; Neander, 1991a, 1991 b.)  According to 
this theory, it is appropriate to say that item X has the function of doing Y just in case 
item X is now present as a result of causing Y.5 The paradigm for the aetiological 
theory is the kind of case where X has been nat urally selected by a mechanism which 
picks out things that cause Y, as in the case of biological evolution by genetic 
selection.  But the aetiological theory can also be extended to cover artefacts like 
thermostats, and indeed human actions in genera l, since human decision-making can 
itself be thought of as a mechanism that selects artefacts and actions because they 
produce certain effects. 
Not everybody agrees about the aetiological account of teleology.  Some people will
want to put scare quotes around words like "purpose" and "design" when they are 
used in connection with blind mechanisms like genetic natural selection.  But we need 
not spend time on this issue here.  For the terminology of "purposes" is not essential 
to my cent ral point -- namely, that there is nothing puzzling about physically quite 
different things all having the same effect, if those physical things are all products of 
some mechanism which selects items because they have that effect.  Adherents of the 
a etiological theory will be able to express this point by saying that there is nothing 
puzzling about the non-reducibility of some special science's phenomena, if those 
phenomena are there for a purpose.  But others can put scare quotes round "purpose "
here if they like. 
Let us now consider the specific question of the reducibility of the generalizations of 
psychology.  Here another kind of selection mechanism, different from both 
biological genetic selection and from intelligent decision-mak ing, becomes 
relevant.  This is selection by individual psychodevelopmental learning.  There are 
good general reasons for supposing that individual learning, at least in its early stages, 
must involve some innate tendency to enhance those neural pathways which lead to 
certain kinds of results, and to discourage neural pathways which lead to other 
results.6  In this sense learning is itself a mechanism that selects items because they 
produce certain results. 
As with all selection mechanisms, the items between which this mechanism chooses 
will be relatively random, depending on such things as idiosyncracies of individual 
circumstance, linguistic training, knocks on the head, or even on genuinely chance 
occurrences in the brain.  (Compare the "mutations" which are inputs to genetic 
selection.)  From the point of view of learning, the precise physical nature of the 
relevant items doesn't matter, provided they produce the right kind of effect. 
And this, finally , is why there is no reason to expect there to be anything physically 
in common between two people when they both believe, say, that there is an ice-
cream in front of them, even though this state has similar effects on their 
behaviour.  The physical realizations are likely to be different simply because the 
inputs to each individual's learning mechanism (the "mutations") will be relatively 
random.  But we needn't be puzzled as to how there can be similarity of effects 
without the physical common ality, for the one thing that the learning mechanism will 
have ensured that the different states which arise when different people look at an ice-
cream will at least share the feature that they will produce appropriate effects in 
appropriate circumstances (such as reaching out for it when you are hungry).7
I earlier mentioned David Lewis's view that mental states are variably realized across 
species, but uniformly realized within species.  The argument of this section 
corroborates Lewi s's commitment to variable realization across species.  But it also 
suggests that he is wrong to stop there, and that we should expect to find variable 
realization within species too.  Across species we find variable realization of innate 
mental states because genetic natural selection preserves any genetic mutation with 
beneficial effects, and such mutations are likely to be different in different 
species.  Entirely analogously, if each individual contains a learning mechanism 
which preser ves any "physiological mutation" with certain beneficial effects, and if 
these physiological mutations are different in different individuals, then the upshot 
will be that even among conspecifics we will find variable physical realizations of 
acquired men tal states. 
Actually, in the case of the mental state that Lewis himself concentrates on, namely, 
pain, there is a reason to expect uniform realizations within species.  For pain is best 
thought of as part of our learning mechanism, rather than a s the kind of mental ability 
that this mechanism produces, given that learning selects precisely those mental items 
that don't cause pain.  Since our basic ability to learn isn't itself learnt, but a 
consequence of our genetic endowment, this is then a reason for thinking that pain, 
and similar basic mental states like hunger, temperature perception, and so on, are 
uniformly realized within species.8
So far in this section I have indicated a way of understanding how various biological 
and psychological non-dispositional categories might have uniform effects even 
though variably realized:  such variable causes can have uniform effects in virtue of 
mechanisms which select items because they have that effect.  The corollary, how 
ever, is that we shouldn't expect non-reducibility in those special sciences where no 
such selection mechanisms are to hand.9 This seems to me to include nearly all special 
sciences apart from biology and psychology.  Perhaps there are som e rudimentary 
selection mechanisms in some of the social sciences, in the form of economic or 
social competitition.  But there are certainly none in such special physical sciences as 
meteorology, or chemistry.  In any case, the general moral sho uld be clear:  special 
categories that aren't products of selection will be reducible. 
Of course, reducibility to physics won't be at issue for sciences whose entities are 
partly psychologically constituted, like sociology or economics, or partly biologically 
constituted, like demography or epidemiology.  For, even if such sciences are 
reducible to psychology or biology, the selection-based irreducibility of the latter 
sciences to physics will block the overall reduction.  However, the point remains that 
the absence of selection mechanisms within such sciences as sociology or 
demography will imply that such sciences will at least be reducible to their 
psychological or biological constituents. 
This last point is illustrated by Fodor' s (1974) discussion of Gresham's law, the 
economic principle that bad money drives out good.  Fodor stresses the extreme 
implausibility of any uniform physical realization of such categories as good and bad 
money.  And of course he is right abou t this.  But at the same time it is worth noting 
that there are obvious psychological reductions of these categories, and 
correspondingly an obvious psychological explanation of Gresham's law.  (Money 
consists of items whcih people exchange for goods and services because they expect 
others to do the same;  such money is good or bad to the extent people believe it will 
continue to be so exchangable;  which is why people will circulate their bad money, 
and hold onto their good.)  Of course these psychological facts won't in turn reduce to 
physical facts, given the teleological underpinnings of psychology.  But the reduction 
of the economic facts to psychological facts is just what my overall theory predicts, 
given that there ar e no economic selection mechanisms to provide an alternative 
explanation of Gresham's law. 
2.8  Selectional Explanations
An obvious question raised by the argument of this chapter is the status of selection al 
explanations themselves.  I have argued that in disciplines with a teleological 
underpinning, such as psychology, we can explain why the disparate physical 
realizations Pi, of some given special category S, all have the same effect T, by 
invoking a selection mechanism which picks out Pis precisely because they cause 
T.  Implicit here is the general claim that, in systems of the relevant kind, if any Pi 
causes T, then that Pi will tend to be preserved.  But what now about this general cla 
im?  Is it itself reducible to physics?  And, if not, doesn't it raise just the same puzzle 
about variably realized generalizations having common effects with which I started 
the paper? 
I think that some such selectionist generalizations (if Pi causes T, then Pi is preserved) 
are physically explainable.  Others, however, will be variably realized.  But then there 
will be some more general selection mechanism which in turn explains the existence 
of the specific selection mechanisms which pick things that cause T.  What about the 
generalization implicit in this last explanation (if a selection mechanism picks Pis that 
cause T, then this selection mechanism will be preserved)?  Well, either this 
generalization will be physic ally explainable, or it will be due to a yet more general 
selection mechanism which . . . is physically explainable. 
So I would say that we can explain patterns that aren't themselves physically 
explainable in terms of selection mechanisms which are, or at least in terms of 
selection mechanisms whose selection is physically explainable, or . . . and so on.  We 
can have hierarchies of selection mechanisms, with variable realizations at each level 
until the last.  But the last level should alw ays offer a uniform physical story, for until 
we have such a uniform physical story the explanatory buck with which I been 
concerned in this paper won't have stopped. 
Let me give an illustration of the simplest case, where some variably realized patte rn 
S -> T is explained by a physically uniform selection mechanism.  Consider some 
simple biological organism which is capable of learning how to get rid of some given 
painful stimulus.  Different individuals in this species will learn physicall y different 
ways getting rid of the pain.  Then, if we think of the avoidance behaviour as S, its 
different realizations as the Pis, and the disappearance of pain as T, we will have the 
generalization S -> T, and this will be variably realized by the different Pis. This is the 
kind of variable generalization that this paper has argued to be prima facie 
puzzling.  In the example at hand we can remove this puzzlement by invoking the 
learning process which ensures that, if any Pi causes T, that Pi will be preserved.  The 
current issue, however, is what kind of explanation we can give of this general 
selectionist fact.  But now recall a point made in the last section, that pain and 
associated learning mechanisms are likely to be innate and so uniformly realized 
within any given species.  If this is right, then a uniform physical explanation for the 
selectionist generalization will be available.  The story will no doubt be 
complicated.  Nevertheless, to postulate that the lea rning mechanism is uniformly 
realized throughout the species is precisely to postulate some physically uniform 
feedback mechanism which is triggered by the disappearance of pain, and which then 
operates to preserve whatever physical behaviour caused thatd isappearance. 
 Does this mean that in this kind of case the original behavioural generalization S -> 
T will be reducible to physics after all?  Only in an extended sense.  There is still no 
uniform physical explanation of why the behaviour S generally gets rid of pain, for S 
is still variably realized at the physical level.  Rather, what we can explain physically 
is why each individual, on receipt of the painful stimulus, performs some bit of 
behaviour which gets rid of the pain.  In effect, what the selectionist story allows us to 
explain is not so much why the behaviour has the effect it does, but rather why each 
individual is disposed to some bit of behaviour with that effect.  This explanation does, 
it is true, imply that all the behaviours in question have the effect they do;  but it 
doesn't do this by identifying a uniform physical reduction for those 
behaviours;  rather it switches to a broader context and instead gives a uniform 
physical account f or each individual having some behaviour with that effect to start 
with. 
Now for a more complicated case.  Suppose again that some group of animals have 
learned some common but variably realized behaviour, but not now because of their 
innate tend ency to avoid pain, but rather because they have all acquired a common 
desire in virtue of their their common experience.  Suppose, for example, they have 
all learned to like bananas.  And suppose that, as a result of having this desire, they ha 
ve all learned ways (though not necessarily the same ways) of doing such things as 
getting bananas down from trees.  Now in this case there won't be any uniform 
physical explanation for their all acquiring such behaviour.  For, if the desires fo r 
bananas are themselves acquired by learning, it is unlikely that those desires will 
themselves have a uniform physical realization, and so unlikely that the feedback 
mechanism responsible for learning how to get bananas down from trees will be 
physicall y uniform across the different individuals. 
Here we need to shift to a yet wider context, and focus on how the desires for bananas 
were acquired in thie first place.  At which point we will presumably want to tell a 
story about a mechanism which selects states (namely, desires) which will cause, and 
help develop, behaviour which will yield results, such as bananas, which in the 
organism's experience have been associated with pleasure or the avoidance of pain --
where this selection mechanism is u niformly realized across the species.  And this 
will then, as before, offer a uniform physical explanation, not of how the movements 
each animal performs lead to bananas (for these movements are physically non-
uniform), nor even of how each animal ha s learned some bit of behaviour which gets 
bananas (these learning processes are physically non-uniform too), but rather of why 
each animal has acquired a state which disposes it to learn some bit of behaviour 
which will get it bananas. 
We could go on .  Generalizations about suitably experienced individuals seeking out 
bananas will hold good across species, as well as within them.  But this then opens up 
the possibility that the associated innate mechanism for acquiring desires will be diffe 
rently physically realized in different individuals who alike seek out bananas, thus 
underming the physical uniformity of the story told in the last paragraph.  But then we 
can widen the context even further, and appeal to intergenerational genetic s election, 
which will then explain these variably realized innate learning mechanisms as 
themselves selected by the physically uniform process which preserves things which 
cause survival and the replication of genetic DNA. 
I am not of course suggesting that special scientists need to go into all this every time 
they appeal to some variably realized special generalization in explaining 
something.  The idea that you must explain everything you use in an explanation is 
obviously self-defeating.  Nevertheless, on the metaphysical level, as opposed to the 
methodological level, it is worth knowing that if we widen the context enough we can 
in principle always show that any variably realized special generalization is the upshot 
of some uniform physi cal process.  For if such physical explanations weren't in 
principle available, it would be incredible that such variably realized generalizations 
should be true. 
1. Functionalism per se can be defined in a way that does not require second-order 
causal roles to be realized by physical states.  However, I have already argued for 
physicalism, in the last chapter.  So I shall henceforth understand "functionalism" to 
stand for the narrower doctrine which does specify physical realizations. 
2. It will ease the exposition if I can assume for the moment that functionalism 
includes the thesis of variable realizability.  So for now functionalism is not just a 
thesis about the meanings of special terms, but that plus the denial of any typ e 
reducibility of the special to the physical.  I shall return to this point in section 2.4 
below. 
3. Searle (1985) agrees with this moral, but takes it to provide a reductio of the 
possibility of special scientific laws:  that is, he argues that, if there were special laws, 
then the categories of the special sciences would have to be reducible to physics;  and 
so, since the categories of the special sciences clearly aren't reducible to physics, there 
can't be any special laws. 
4. I am here thinking primarily of reducibility to intrinsic physical characteristics of 
red objects, such as the molecular constitution of their surfaces.  (Cf. Smith, 
1987).  But the point also applies (pace Smith) to the reducibility of redness t o such 
relational physical characteristics as transmitting certain wavelengths of light in 
certain sorts of illumination;  maybe there isn't even anything in common about the 
relational physical properties of red things, apart from the fact they make normal 
people see red.  Indeed, there arguably isn't even any immediate reason for supposing 
there must be something physically in common even between the way different 
people respond perceptually to red objects:  couldn't each person learn som e physical 
way of reliably responding to what everybody else called "red", but with different 
people doing this in physically different ways?  But perhaps this last extreme anti-
reductionsist conjecture is in tension with the ability of different peo ple to agree in 
identifying previously unobserved objects as red, even though redness is a secondary 
quality whose instances have nothing in common except their ability to make people 
experience red. 
5. It is unfortunate that "function" and its cognat es are used both for the teleological 
notion of causes that are explained by their effects, and for the definitional notion of 
concepts that can be defined as elements in a structure of causes and effects.  The two 
ideas are quite distinct. 
6. Se e Chapter 3 of Daniel Dennett's Content and Consciousness (1969) for general 
reasons why learning must work like this, and recent "connectionist" models of 
pattern recognition for specific illustrations.  In particular, see Andy Clark (1989, pp 
12-13 ) for an instance of how similar teaching can train neural nets with random 
initial conditions into the same (high-level) structures. 
7. I am in effect arguing that the categories of non-reducible special sciences must 
have purposive functions, to exp lain their non-reduciblity.  Lycan (19xx) and Sober 
(19yy) have argued similarly that functionalist theories of mind need to be 
supplemented by teleology, lest too many systems count as minds:  their idea is that 
not anything with a certain caus al structure should count as a mind, just those 
systems which are designed to have that structure.  However, while the conclusions 
are similar, it is worth noting that the argument I have given has both wider scope and 
greater force. It argues that t eleology is needed not just in functionalist accounts of 
mind, but in any law-governed non-reducible realm.  And the rationale is not just that 
the functionalist theory of mental concepts would founder without teleology, but that 
there wouldn't be an y non-reducible special laws without teleology. 
8. This point might seem open to dispute.  If, within a species, two physically 
different genes produce exactly the same phenotypic effects in different ways, then 
both genes will be equally favoure d by natural selection.  Indeed, short of knowledge 
of their detailed DNA structure, two such genotypes are likely be counted as one by 
biologists.  This suggests the possibility of two physically different types of pain 
within one species.  ; However, it is empirically unlikely that variant physical 
components in such a complex mechanism as pain would ever have exactly the same 
selection-relevant effects.  This case is different from the case of different species, for 
in different speci es natural selection will favour different physical bases for roughly 
the same job as long as they have roughly similar effects.  But within an interbreeding
species there will be direct competition between such physical alternatives, and so 
such alt ernatives will only both be preserved if they have an exact selective 
equivalence. 
9. Why should appeal to selection mechanisms be the only way of explaining away 
non-reducibility?  But what else could account for the fact that physically dispara te 
items have the same effect, except some mechanism that picks them out because they 
have that effect? 
